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Introduction: Southern Africa: Frameworks for Thinking
Percy Selwyn'
All of us necessarily have a parochial view of the
world; we see it through the distorting medium of
our own concerns. Since concerns differ, we find it
difficult to recognise other people's world-pictures.
But in spite of this, many with widely different -
indeed opposing - world views are united in finding
Southern Africa of central interest. Why is this?
First, there are material concerns. Southern Africa
is a major source of certain important materials
(gold, diamonds, chrome, platinum and uranium).
There is a natural concern that supplies should not
be interrupted. There are substantial investments -
both from Europe and America - in the region, and
there is also concern with the maintenance of
markets.
Secondly, there are what might be described as
geo-political interests. Western politicians and
publicists see the area in terms of Soviet
expansionism. Public statements of South African
leaders are along similar lines, although it is not
clear how far such statements are genuinely
believed and how far they are intended as a
diversion from other issues. Others [eg Johnson
1977] point to the activities of western powers (the
United States and France in particular) in the
region. Some of the African countries are con-
cerned with the expansionist policies - political and
economic - of the Republic of South Africa. But,
whatever the interpretation, there is widespread
concern that the region may be the setting for con-
flicts which could well take on a world dimension.
Lastly there are what might be called ideological
and moral issues. There are those who are centrally
aware of the extreme and institutionalised inequali-
ties in the region - and in particular the racial
inequalities inside South Africa itself.
As a reflection of these powerful, if conflicting,
interests, Southern Africa enjoys widespread, if
confusing, publicity in the world press.
The Institute of Development Studies has also had
a substantial research interest in the region (see p.
77). In this number of the Bulletin, we draw
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attention to some of our concerns. We have not
attempted to compete with the journalistic, sharply
contemporary, treatment of these issues to be found
in the periodical press. Our approach is both more
analytic and longer-term - although this should not
detract from its interest. Indeed, standing back from
the strictly contemporary is essential to under-
standing.
This issue of the Bulletin, then, illustrates some of
our concerns in the region. lt makes no claim to be
representative; moreover, it represents no common
view. As with the world at large, assumptions and
approaches within the Institute vary widely. But
more than anything else, there is no common
model, no agreed framework for thinking about
South Africa.
As I have emphasised, we see the world through the
distorting medium of our own concerns. These
concerns may be individual, or those of our social
class, ethnic group, or nation, or other grouping.
Indeed, social reality is so complex that we need
some framework for thinking about it. We would
all accept the impossibility of considering any
social situation without some underlying - even if
hardly conscious - model. We need a mental frame-
work in order to make sense of the confusion of the
real world, to make predictions, and as a guide to
effective action. Such models are not neutral. Just
as different people or groups have conflicting
interests and concerns, so they will not necessarily
fInd any particular model of equal utility. Since any
model involves some simplification of reality, some
principle of selection, there is a wide range of
possible frameworks for thinking about any social
problem. And the range of concerns about
Southern Africa - both within and outside the
region - has given rise to a confusion of models.
Some of these models may indeed be dismissed as
fraudulent. Just as the performer of the three-card
trick succeeds by making his victim see things in a
certain way, so some of the commonly purveyed
models for Southern Africa appear to be intended
less as a framework for understanding or prediction
than as a means of influencing thought.
The principal fraudulent model is that of separate
development'. Blacks and whites are so clearly part
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of the same system and (as [Butler, Rotberg and
Adams L9771 point out) the separate 'nationalities'
involved are so much the artificial creation of the
South African Government, as to cast doubt on the
sincerity of those who propound the model. If (like
some of the Afrikaner leaders of the 1940s and
19 50s) white advocates of separate development
were to dispense with black labour, and white
workers were to do all the dirty, unpleasant and
badly paid jobs in the 'white' economy, it would at
least be possible to take the concept seriously. In
the event, it is difficult to look on 'separate develop-
ment' as more than an attempt to conceal social
reality.
At the other extreme, there are mental frameworks
which are prevalent but not openly acknowledged. I
suspect that the model which is most widely held -
consciously or unconsciously - by the white
community is that summed up with typical irony in
Mark Twain's Huckleberry Finn. Huck has told a
farmer's wife in the deep south that a cylinder-head
has blown out on a steam-boat. She comments:
'Good gracious! anybody hurt?'
'No Killed a nigger.'
'Well, it 's lucky because sometimes people do get
hurt
That blacks are not 'people' is fundamental in
white South Africa. This does not of course
distinguish white South Africans from Catholics
and Protestants in Northern Ireland, Arabs and
Jews in Palestine, Brahmins and Harijans in India,
Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi, Brazilians and
Amerindians in the Amazon, Europeans and
Aborigines in Australia or Sinhalese and Tamils in
Sri Lanka. But an appreciation of the fact is
essential to an understanding of the working of the
South African system.
But Afrikaner academics have produced more
'respectable' models. One such, which is both
classificatory and normative, is that of the 'plural
society'. (See for example [Rhoodie 19781.)
According to this model, South Africa should be
seen as an example of societies consisting of more
than one ethnic, cultural or religious group, where
group identity may be supposed to be more
powerful than national identity. The question
raised by this model is how such groups can best
live together in a common society; what political,
administrative or constitutional arrangements will
best ensure both human rights for the individual
and what Rhoodie describes as rights 'related to the
survival and preservation of the cultural identities,
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life-styles and basic social institutions of his-
torically established groups'.
There is no question that this picture of the
problems facing a 'plural society' (however defined)
has some basis in social reality. But it raises two
questions. First, how far are Rhoodie's 'cultural
identities, life-styles and basic social institutions'
merely a reflection of situations of privilege or
deprivation? If we look at white life-styles in South
Africa, these surely are the mirror-image of a social
structure permitting whites to maintain a standard
of living which is astonishingly high, not only by
South African but by world standards. Again, the
'life-style' of a Mosotho farmer, who is compelled
to spend much of his life working in the South
African mines in order to be able to subsist, clearly
reflects his relative deprivation in the Southern
African system. Secondly, the model ignores the
way in which life-styles and cultures have been and
continue to be moulded by the development of
South African industrial capitalism. Half a century
ago, the Afrikaners were a mainly rural com-
munity, with rural attitudes and rurally based
institutions. Today the Afrikaners are predomin-
antly urban; there is a new class of Afrikaner
capitalist; there has been increasing social dif-
ferentiation inside the Afrikaner community.
Similarly, industrialisation has brought a growing
community of urban blacks, whose links with their
'historic' societies have become increasingly
tenuous (except in so far as the South African
authorities compel them to maintain - or even
invent - such links). It has helped create a small
black bourgeoisie, but has very severely limited its
potential for growth.
Thus the 'plural society' model, when applied in a
normative sense to the specific circumstances of
Southern Africa, has more to offer the privileged
than the unprïvïleged. By taking cultural dif-
ferences as absolutes, and ignoring their social and
economic bases, it helps to maintain the status quo.
Indeed, preserving the 'culture and life-style' of the
white communities looks very much like preserving
their positions of privilege - if indeed the two are
not identical.
The obverse of the 'plural societies' model is the
view, widespread among blacks, that the essence of
the Southern African system is the monopolistic
access to and control over resources in the region by
the whites, and their determination to maintain this
monopoly. This model has many strengths. It helps
to explain much in South Africa which is
inexplicable on any other assumption. It is a not
unreasonable explanation of South African Bantu-
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stan policies - as a means of depriving blacks of any
political or other claim on South African resources.
It can be used for prediction; any policy or tactic
employed by the ruling groups in South Africa will
be centrally concerned with maintaining white
control over resources. This helps both to identify
the constraints bounding such policies and to
interpret apparent policy changes as they occur.
Thus, although some degree of 'token' advancement
may be forseeable for certain privileged groups of
blacks (as, for example, proposed by Wiehahn) it
will be more a means of buying a few black allies
than any genuine opening up of access to resources
for blacks as a group.
At the same time, it clearly has its inadequacies. It
ignores the changing structure of the Southern
African economy and the dynamics of South
African capitalism. Thus it does not take into
account the possibility that there may well be
differences of interest inside the white community
itself - between 'international' and national
capitalists, between the mining industry (with its
historic dependence on cheap migrant labour) and
manufacturing industry (which has seen advantages
in a settled black labour force) or between highly
paid white workers and many employers who
would prefer a non-racially organised labour force.
A variant of this model is the view that the South
African system can be understood only in the
context of Afrikaner nationalism - or as Maasdorp
argues, as the result of Afrikaners' determination
that they should never again be ruled by others.
Since the immediate threat to this position would
be from blacks, this would involve racial
segregation and the exclusion of blacks from any
political rights. Since historically the Afrikaners
have been dependent on international and local
English speaking capitalists, this also involved the
Afrikaner-controlled state machine in building up
national - and in particular Afrikaner - capitalism.
In contrast to these essentially racial or communal
models, there are frameworks which appear to
ignore - or at least accord little importance to - the
ethnic elements in South African society. Here I
will refer to only two such models - general
development models and some of the Marxist
models.
Several types of development model have been
applied to South Africa. They have in common the
view that the Southern African system can best be
understood in the context of the problems facing
'developing' countries in general. A composite view
might run roughly as follows. In any developing
country, there are certain leading sectors (eg
manufacturing , or mining). It is in these sectors
that the bulk of capital formation takes place; their
surpluses provide the savings for further invest-
ment; they are the centre of whatever innovation
takes place within the society. Their development
involves the growth of inequality - mainly between
those who are directly involved in this sector, and
those who are not. This is inevitable; the modem
sector can provide employment for only a fraction
of those wishing to enter it. This creates tensions
and pressures within the society which are con-
tained in different ways in different countries. One
of the main problems faced in such systems is that
of internal migration. People move from places
where possible rewards are few (cg regions of
traditional agriculture) to places where there are
possibilities of entering the modern sector.
In such a situation, governments have to decide
what to do about migration. They can adopt a
laisser-faire approach. This creates both mass
unemployment and other social problems in the
urban areas, as well as a drain on manpower and
enterprise in the rural subsistence areas. Alterna-
tively, they can attempt to control the movement.
Such controls (or even forcible repatriation to rural
areas) may be exercised by either capitalist or
socialist governments - by South Africa, Senegal
and the Philippines, as well as by China, USSR,
Kampuchea and Vietnam. Restrictions on urbani-
sation may be associated with positive policies to
improve conditions in the areas of emigration.
A further feature of the general development model
is that it may also cover the spatial elements in
development. Spatial inequalities can be under-
stood in the context of a centre/periphery model,
whereby both growth at the centre and decay at the
periphery are self-reinforcing [Board, Davis and
Fair 1970]. Such models imply that the appropriate
comparisons with South Africa are such countries
as Mexico and Brazil, which have experienced
rapid industrial growth over the past decade, and
have equally faced problems of urban unemploy-
nient, shanty towns and backward peripheries. One
might charitably suppose that Dr Connie Mulder
had such a model in mind when he replied to the
question how he would morally defend influx
control:
by protecting black people from being exploited
by employers. If there were no influx control yoti
would get for every loo vacancies in established
urban areas 300 to 400 people competing for
these jobs and employers would negotiate rock-
bottom wages. In the meantime, somebody has to
provide houses for these people and education
and health Jàcilities, who 's got to pay for it? It
becomes totally impossible. Influx control means
that you let 200 people in for 100 vacancies and
they get reasonable wages. So it's in the interests
ofthe blacks themselves
[Starcke 19781
Apart from the interesting assumption that blacks
who do not come into the urban areas require
neither education nor health facilities (or at least
that somebody else will pay for them) Dr Mulder's
statement brings out the central flaw in the model
as applied in South Africa - that is, the racial bias
of South African policies. After all, the urban white
population of South Africa increased by 88 per cent
in the quarter century between 1946 and 1970,
while the rural white population fell by 24 per cent.
There was, however, no question of applying influx
controls, the labour bureau system and all the other
restrictions on urban employment to the whites.
Unemployment among urban whites is indeed
negligible, but this merely reflects the advantages in
access to the job market which present arrange-
ments accord them. Not the least of these
advantages is that government expenditure per
head on education is some 15 times greater for
whites than for blacks. Thus the inequalities
implied by this particular model of development
have taken a special racial form in Southern Africa.
Just as the general development models understate
the racial element in the South African system, so
do some of the Marxist models. Here the emphasis
is on the working of the capitalist system - both
nationally and internationally. Forty years ago, the
view of the (then legal) Communist Party of South
Africa was that the South African system was
essentially one of class struggle, of the exploitation
of black and white workers by (mainly interna-
tional) capitalists. On this interpretation, the
conflicts between black and white workers met the
needs of the capitalists by diverting the attention of
both blacks and whites into racial conflict rather
than class struggle. The appropriate policy was the
cooperation of black and white workers against
exploitation, and for a socialist non-racial South
Africa.
At the time, this model had a certain plausibility,
although subsequent events showed it to be a
complete disaster as a guide to action. lt is
paralleled by the failure of the Populists in the
American South during the years after Reconstruc-
tion. They too tried to forge an alliance between
poor whites and poor blacks. Tom Watson, a
leading southern white Populist, said to blacks and
whites:
you are made to hate each other because upon
that hatred is rested the keystone of the arch of
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6financial despotism which enslaves you
both the coloured tenant is in the
same boat with the white tenant, the coloured
labourer with the white labourer the acci-
dent of colour can make no difference in the
interests o firmers croppers and labourers.
[Woodward 1965: ch III
Both the Populists and the South African
Communists appear to have believed that class
interest would (or could) surmount racial divisions.
I do not know how many members of the
(now illegal) Communist Party of South Africa
would still subscribe to these views. Contemporary
Marxist studies in South Africa appear to have
abandoned this line, although I find some
ambiguity in their attitude to the racial issue. Their
main emphasis is on the working of capitalism in
South Africa, the nature of class formations, and in
particular the role of migrant labour. (See for
example Review of African Political Economy, no 7
and [Adler 1977].) In particular, they draw from
Marx's discussion of the industrial reserve army
created by capitalism, and, as Marx argues, a
condition of the capitalist mode of production [see
Capital, vol 1 ch 25 section 3 1.
The Marxist model gives rise to many difficulties. If
Marxist analysis is in terms of classes and the class
struggle, what, in South African terms, is a class?
Indeed, Fisher, in her very interesting contribution
to the Adler collection of papers, goes so far as to
argue that white workers and black workers are
different classes. This is so because they think of
themselves as different classes - that is, class is
defined in terms of consciousness, rather than in
relation to the forces of production. This view
(which does not differ greatly from that of Taicott
Parsons, below) seems to reverse earlier emphases
of Marxist writing on South Africa. Again,
problems arise because of the very different
interests of, say, international mining companies
and South African urban industrial capitalists.
lt would be unfair to generalise about the very wide
range of views and emphases in the Marxist
literature it is apparent that there is a lively
continuing debate. But, however unjust this may
be, I find some of the discussion both excessively
abstract and remote from any possible action.
Indeed, it is difficult to see what threat much of this
writing could possibly pose to the existing power
structure. The Marxist models do however raise
two central issues in ways of looking at South
Africa - the role of the state, and the role of
capitalism.
If, as many Marxists would argue, the state is the
instrument of the capitalist class, we would expect
those elements in present state policies which are
inconsistent with the further development of the
capitalist mode of production to disappear in time.
Indeed, it has been argued that capitalism has a
potentially progressive' role to play in so far as job
reservation, access control and all the other features
of South African labour policy are incompatible
with what Adam Smith called the free circulation
of labour from one employment to another'. This is
a view expressed by many South African white
liberals.
The argument can, of course, be put the other way
round. The development of the capitalist mode of
production has relied, historically, on the existence
of labour reserves, and if the actual wage rate in the
modern capitalist sector is kept below subsistence
levels through the provision of some part of
subsistence in the traditional economy, then it will
be in the interests of capitalism to maintain the
status quo. In other words, it is just as possible io
argue that capitalism will play a conservative role
as that it will play a progressive' role in future
social development.
In all this, there is a hidden assumption. Can we
assume a purely instrumental role for the state? Is it
not possible that the state has a dynamic of its own?
The interests of the capitalist mode of production
may act as a constrclint on the range of action open
to any South African Government but will they
completely determine state policy? Should we not
allow for the possibility that the state will respond,
not only to capitalist interests, but also to the
perceived interests of the white community, who
are in effective control of the state machine? Again,
is it possible that capitalism determines the form
rather than the fact of social inequality?
This is to argue the inadequacy of any model which
concentrates exclusively on one element in the
South African situation - whether it be capitalism,
white supremacy or the international context. We
need an eclectic frame of thinking for an under-
standing of the complexities of South African
society. But there may be common ground between
at least some of these models. Thus, in practice,
interpretation in terms of class structures and in
racial terms may not differ widely. As Taicott
Parsons [in Rhoodie 1978] points out:
the two bases of diffuse solidarity, namely
ethnicity and class, have (in South Africa) come to
be amalgamated in one aspect of cleavage,
namely the white upper, to use the Marxist
symbolism, capitalist class, and the black lower
working class'. This does not fit exactly, but it
has developed to a very sharp degree of accentua-
tion.
This identity, according to Parsons, is the special
feature of the South African form of capitalism as
compared with, say, American capitalism. A
central question, then, is how far the present power
structure will be able or willing to defuse the im-
plied combination of racial and class conflict
which, to an outsider, seems the inevitable outcome
of present policies.
At this point I should make my own position clear.
As someone who loves South Africa but hates the
South African system, who does not view with
pleasure the prospect of civil war in South Africa
but who recognises that the time could come when
the actions of the present ruling groups leave those
desiring reform with little alternative to violent
action, whose sympathies are with those whom the
present system excludes but who harbours no
illusions that poor, black people are necessarily any
more virtuous than rich, white ones, or would
inevitably behave any better if they were in power
(although it would be difficult for them to behave
worse) - as someone with these apparently
inconsistent views, I find a framework roughly on
the following lines of most assistance in illuminat-
ing contemporary Southern African society:
the central issue in Southern Africa is that of
inequality. The most obvious form of this
inequality in South Africa itself is in terms of
colour, but there are other inequalities - of
access to and control over resources, of location,
and of relative political power;
there is no simple explanation of present
inequalities, whether in terms of colour, the
workings of national or international capitalism,
or the operation of centre/periphery systems.
All these interact, and each leaves its mark on
the nature of inequality;
equally, inequalities would persist if only one of
these elements were present. Racial discrimina-
tion, capitalism and regional disparities all have
their own dynamic; each is adaptable to a
variety of circumstances. 'Socialist' systems can
(and do) co-exist with discrimination against
particular ethnic groups and the continuation
and strengthening of regional disparities;
capitalism involves inequality, whether racial or
other; regional development policies are not
inconsistent with other forms of inequality.
but the most urgent issue - because most
insulting to human dignity - is inequality based
on racial origin - at least in those countries still
ruled by racially separate minorities. If a pro-
gramme for the immediate elimination of all
forms of inequality is not practicable, those con-
cerned with inequality in these countries will
give first priority to issues of racial inequality;
in doing so, they need not assume that national
or international capitalism is necessarily an ally
or an enemy. Capitalism is a highly adaptable
system. The concern of the capitalist is to make
profits and accumulate capital. This can be done
successfully in a variety of social systems. We
need only observe powerful international
capitalist groups subsidising opposing parties in
past internal conflicts in Zimbabwe.
it should not be assumed that the South African
state is the instrument of national or interna-
tional capitalism. Nor should the power,
toughness or persistence of the existing state
machine, or its ability to operate in a variety of
guises, be underestimated. And it is reasonable to
assume that this power, toughness and persis-
tence will be employed very centrally for
the maintenance of white status and power.
This framework is both eclectic and pragmatic. As
will be apparent from this number of the Bulletin, it
is not necessarily shared by our contributors, who
clearly do not have any common model. The two
papers on South Africa, by Maasdorp and Ward, do
not question the capitalist structure of South
African society. They implicitly accept a standard
'development' model not very different from that
which I have described above. What I find interest-
ing about their papers is that both conclude that the
stated aims of South African regional policy are
impossible of realisation. Their conclusions seem
to me all the more powerful because of the
conventional model underlying their thinking. But
I must admit to reservations about Ward's
approach. Although his concluding paragraph
would lead to a different conclusion, much of his
paper appears to imply that 'planning' for the
benefit of the poor is (or could be) a meaningful
process in the Ciskei - that is to say, within a total
social and political context which makes such
planning at best irrelevant and at worst a deliberate
attempt to divert attention from the realities of
power. Clearly Ward's concern is to see what could
be done within the existing political context to
improve the conditions of the mass of the people in
the Ciskei. This is an aim which many of us would
share. But anyone concerned to improve the lot of
the poor should consider how far any specific
measure he proposes is likely to strengthen those
very structures which exclude the poor from access
to material resources and political influence. Not to
do so is to fall into the trap laid by the South
African Government.
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Of the papers concerned with the Southern African
region outside South Africa, only one - that by
Parson - is centrally concerned with the working of
regional and international capitalism. One of the
virtues of his paper is that it draws our attention to
the fact that inequality between black and white is
not the only kind of inequality within the region.
But it seems to me paradoxical that the policy
suggestions emerging from his analysis are very
similar to those in Lipton's study of Botswana,
although their implicit models are totally different.
The papers by Colciough on regional labour issues,
by Harvey on Botswana monetary policy, and by
Green on the potential for regional cooperation,
are more concerned with the possibilities for
countries in the region to diminish their
dependence on South Africa than with the working
of capitalism in Southern Africa. They assume that
the countries of the region will continue to have a
variety of social structures, more or less closely
involved in the international capitalist system.
What, on this assumption, is the room for
manoeuvre in the Southern African periphery? All
three conclude that there is an agenda for action -
whether in the areas of monetary policy, labour
policy or regional cooperation. Outcomes are not
completely determined, either by the forces of
international capitalism or by the power of the
South African state and economy.
The papers by Green and Kilj unen on Namibia and
by Riddell on Zimbabwe draw attention to the
implicit models of the national liberation move-
ments. In both countries, movements which
originated as reactions against the white monopoly
of access to resources have necessarily broadened
their thinking. In Namibia, SWAPO has been
compelled to develop a complex model which takes
account of both racial and social inequalities. In
Zimbabwe, the situation is less clear; the national
movement operated on no unified model. But in
both countries the fact of liberation struggle has
militated against the adoption of single-factor
models - whether of simple black-white opposition
or of the struggle against national or international
capitalism.
There is an interesting contrast between the papers
by Green and Riddell, on the one hand, and that by
Kiljunen on the other. Green and Riddell are
concerned with immediate, indeed urgent, issues of
public policy, whereas Kiljunen is concerned with
statements. I have been glad to include Kiljunen's
contribution because the information on SWAPO's
ideological position and its evolution is interesting,
and provides a useful complement to Green's more
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policy-oriented approach. But all of us would
recognise the need to go beyond statements.
Liberation movements have of necessity to recruit
support from a variety of sources, internal and
international. Their public statements reflect this
need. We need not assume that they are insincere.
But a successful liberation movement may well find
itself in situations to which its previous rhetoric
provides inadequate answers, and subject to
pressures for greater 'pragmatism' or greater
'purism'. Kiijunen argues that the mere fact of
armed struggle makes it likely that present state-
ments will be embodied in future policy. This is a
question which invites further study. In addition to
a description of SWAPO's ideological evolution,
we need an analysis of the forces likely to operate in
an independent Namibia and their probable impact
on public policy. Kiljunen makes us aware of the
rhetoric; but we also need a broadly analytical view
of probable policy outcomes.
We had hoped to include an article on the develop-
ment of health policy in Mozambique. The
provision of health services is an important
example both of degrees of inequality in society - as
between urban and rural areas, regions, classes or
ethnic groups - and of alternative frameworks for
thinking. In developing countries with largely rural
and deprived populations, we would expect
socialist governments to allocate resources to meet
the urgent health needs of the mass of the people.
This involves giving priority to the wide dispersion
of low-cost promotive, preventive and curative
services rather than concentrating attention on
expensive hospitals, which centralise resources on
curative care in the urban areas. Since indepen-
dence in 1975, Mozambique has achieved a
reputation for its policy of primary health
care. However, the recent dismissal of the
Minister of Health makes the interpretation of
this past health policy, as well as predictions
about possible future developments, somewhat
problematic. Mozambique's health policy is
presumably under review; it therefore seemed
inappropriate to write on the subject since any
article would have to be largely speculative.
Finally, we come to Gay's paper on the migration
of women from Lesotho. I find her contribution the
most compelling in this collection. Her implicit
model is again different from that of the other
contributors, since it adds a new dimension to
inequality - that between men and women within a
total context of deprivation. But the main
difference between Gay and most other strands of
thinking about Southern Africa is that we find
ourselves in a world of people rather than of
abstractions. We see people who are struggling to
survive in a hostile society. White South Africa
denies that blacks are people; it takes thinking such
as this to bring us back to reality.
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